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Abstract—This paper describes the theory and considerations in 
the application of model-based techniques to assimilate 
information from disjoint knowledge sources for performing 
NASA’s Fault Management (FM)-related activities using the 
TEAMS® toolset. FM consists of the operational mitigation of 
existing and impending spacecraft failures. NASA’s FM 
directives have both design-phase and operational-phase goals. 
This paper highlights recent studies by QSI and DST of the 
capabilities required in the TEAMS® toolset for conducting FM 
activities with the aim of reducing operating costs, increasing 
autonomy, and conforming to time schedules. These studies use 
and extend the analytic capabilities of QSI’s TEAMS® toolset to 
conduct a range of FM activities within a centralized platform. 
Keywords—FM design, architectural trade studies, multi-domain 
data integration, common cause failures (CCFs), Failure Effect 
Propagation Timing (FEPT), system health management (SHM). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As science missions and human spaceflight missions are 
tasked with increasingly complex goals and have more 
pressure to reduce the overall operations costs while ensuring 
mission success, enhanced system autonomy is a critical 
component to cost reduction. Fault Management (FM) is one 
of the key components of system autonomy. FM consists of 
the operational mitigation of existing and impending failures. 
FM is implemented with spacecraft hardware, on-board 
autonomous software that controls the hardware, information 
and analytical redundancy, and ground-based software and 
task procedures. For human-crewed systems, the on-board 
crew can also perform task procedures. The ability to execute 
appropriate and timely mitigating actions as part of an FM 
system is thus a key enabler for satisfying complex mission 
goals, and for enhancing mission success.  
NASA has invested significant effort and has developed a 
draft FM Handbook [1] to improve FM design, development, 
verification & validation, and operational processes. NASA’s 
FM directives have both design-phase and operational-phase 
goals. The FM Handbook provides guidelines for realizing the 
design and operational goals with the aid of advanced Model-
Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) software tools. During 
the design phase these tools should be able to model a system 
from the FM perspective, support design evaluation and 
validation activities, identify design shortcomings and 
inconsistencies, and aid FM design updates and revisions. 
During the operational phase, these tools should perform 
failure detection, fault diagnostics and prognostics; assess 
functional capabilities; provide information to support 
actionable FM decisions; facilitate optimal troubleshooting 
and maintenance; and assess probabilities of individual 
mission objective satisfaction and for overall mission success.   
NASA uses a variety of tools to conduct its FM activities. 
These tools are varied and disjoint, and often require manual 
intervention to transfer data from the output of one tool to the 
input of another. This process is tedious and error-prone, and 
scales poorly for large, complex systems. Individual tools are 
often confined to the unique purpose for which they were 
designed. These tool-related issues hinder FM engineers from 
gaining insight into system-level design and characteristics 
that are key to transparency, verifiability and efficiency of 
implementing and testing FM. A central platform is needed 
that can (1) perform FM architecture trade studies of cost-
effective FM design architectures and operations, (2) provide 
an efficient way to develop and test FM models and 
algorithms, (3) provide performance metrics of FM designs, 
(4) integrate data from multi-domain tools, (5) develop test 
suites automatically for verification & validation, and (6) 
provide visualization of FM design across the life cycle of a 
system.  
This paper provides an overview of proposed capabilities in 
TEAMS® and the concomitant software tools to (1) capture 
diverse and disjoint data products and multi-domain modeling 
information into TEAMS® for standardizing FM techniques 
and processes, (2) improve the productivity of model 
(knowledge) creation and the FM design process, (3) conduct 
Architecture Trade Studies focusing on failure detection 
(including launch vehicle abort trigger) effectiveness with 
related sensor suite selection, and (4) introduce ancillary 
capabilities in TEAMS® such as assessment of Failure Effect 
Propagation Timing (FEPT) and Common Cause Failures 
(CCFs) to aid in analytical tasks. 
The main objective of the efforts described in this paper is to 
position TEAMS® as the platform of choice for conducting 
many FM-related activities. Rather than replacing existing 
MBSE and Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA) tools 
(SysML, FMECA, etc.), its purpose is to be a central platform 
to assimilate pertinent FM modeling information about a 
system from varied modeling sources. This would benefit 
NASA tremendously since the data and model information 
will be centralized, coherent and consistent, and therefore 
conducive to performing FM analyses. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
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describes our semantics-based multi-domain model capture 
and integration concept. Section III describes how TEAMS® 
can utilize the captured multi-domain model information to 
conduct various architecture trade studies. Section IV 
discusses various capabilities that are being, or need to be 
incorporated in TEAMS® to conduct these trade studies. 
Section V illustrates an example multi-domain model 
integration process from a systems engineering data source in 
Excel format, and a representative FM Architecture Trade 
study conducted by TEAMS® using the engineering data. The 
paper concludes with a summary in Section VI, 
acknowledgements in Section VII and references in Section 
VIII. 
II. SEMANTIC-BASED MULTI-DOMAIN MODEL CAPTURE  
Many of NASA’s current MBSE practices involve SysML [2] 
as the chief modeling language. Various plug-ins to import 
models from other sources, such as FMECA spreadsheets, 
have been developed within the framework of SysML 
authoring tools. However, SysML tools do not usually have an 
extensive modeling framework upon which to address FM 
activities and analyses that can provide information to meet 
needs of project managers and FM engineers early in design, 
or improve the efficiency of implementing and testing FM. 
Moreover, the models generated in SysML tools do not 
typically capture the intricate failure dependencies that exist 
among system components. For example, a fault in one 
component in a coupled system often creating cascades of 
failure effects impacting other components, thereby changing 
overall system health and reliability. A TEAMS®-based, 
system-level FM modeling platform overcomes this problem 
by translating the impact of component-level faults to 
subsystem or system-level metrics that take into account 
failure effect propagation in the coupled system. 
A QSI-DST semantics-based approach seeks to integrate 
multi-domain data and models into the TEAMS® modeling 
framework. The approach (shown in Figure 1) leverages 
Eclipse Modeling Framework (EMF) [3] and uses a Model-
driven approach to transform systems that are made up of 
different technologies.  
 
Figure 1: Multi-Domain Model Integration 
The main steps involved in the transformation are: 
• Discover: First, a metamodel that describes an existing 
legacy system is created. Then, based on the metamodel 
of the system representation, the underlying legacy model 
of the system is discovered. 
• Generate: From the discovered model, a generic (domain-
independent) Ecore model [4] is generated for viewing 
and editing. 
• Transform: This step involves converting the generic 
model to the desired TEAMS® output format. 
This approach involves engaging with various NASA systems 
engineering and FM modeling teams to identify system 
engineering specifications, requirements, parameters, etc. for 
creating the corresponding semantic meta-models from those 
repositories. Examples of domain models are: 
• Channelization Spreadsheet: This document uses an 
Excel format, and depicts bus mapping, wiring 
information and hardware channelization. Using this as a 
basis of connections between various modules and 
submodules, a multi-signal TEAMS® model can be 
constructed. QSI already has a proprietary spreadsheet 
model format (dependency information) that is imported 
into TEAMS®. This capability can be enhanced to 
incorporate other spreadsheet sources. 
• Abort Analysis Matrix (AAM): This Excel spreadsheet 
contains the Mission & Fault Management (M&FM) 
group’s model of Space Launch System (SLS) abort 
trigger (AT) effectiveness. It uses the Loss of Mission 
(LOM) scenarios provided by Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (PRA) group and their associated 
probabilities, grouped by vehicle mission phase. Using 
this spreadsheet, the ATs (failure detections of conditions 
for which an abort response is necessary), which in 
TEAMS® parlance are Sensor Tests, can be imported into 
TEAMS® along with the detections, false-positive/false-
negative properties, etc. 
• Fault Trees/FMECA Reports: Fault trees and FMECA 
(Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis) 
information can be captured in TEAMS® provided they 
can be exported into a standardized file format, such as 
Excel or XML, by the tools in which they are authored. 
NASA has several formats for these:  
o SLS PRA Model (top down): The PRA fault tree 
model of the SLS is in SAPHIRE format and is 
created by the Safety and Mission Assurance 
(S&MA) PRA group.  
o Element FMEAs (bottom up): Created by the S&MA 
Reliability Group, these engine specific Failure Mode 
and Effect Analysis (FMEA) documents pertain to 
Core Stage, Main Engine, Upper Stage, etc. of the 
SLS. The main goal is to capture common failure 
modes and correlations among these disparate 
FMEAs into an integrated TEAMS® model. 
o Hazard Trees (top down): These are created by the 
S&MA Systems Safety group using tools such as 
CAFTA. The hazard tree contains causal 
relationships between intermediate and top-level 
effects.  
Of particular interest are various input parameter spreadsheets 
(tables containing sensor properties, such as False Positives 
(FP), latency, etc.) for trade study of launch vehicle AT suite 
selection [6]. A suitable sub-system model can be utilized for 
the aforementioned architecture trade studies with inputs from 
the parameter spreadsheets. Candidate models for these 
studies include a Spacecraft Propellant model, the SLS model, 
AMPS (AES (Advanced Exploration Systems) Modular 
Power System) model, and the CDS (Cascade Distillation 
System) model. 
III. FM ARCHITECTURE TRADE-STUDIES 
The main purpose of having multi-domain data captured in a 
TEAMS® model is to leverage its built-in analytic capabilities 
to quantitatively conduct FM architecture trade studies. NASA 
devises FM approaches, architectures, and tools for 
implementing and testing FM. As previously noted, the use of 
separate multi-domain modeling and analysis techniques can 
lead to expensive, disjoint and sometimes inconsistent 
analyses. Data integrity and consistency is needed between 
multi-domain tools. TEAMS®, being a Commercial Off-the-
Shelf (COTS) product and already used by NASA to conduct 
various FM activities, is a natural fit to determine the 
completeness and appropriateness of FM designs and 
implementations. Examples of the FM architecture trade space 
studies currently conducted by NASA that can be assimilated 
into TEAMS® are described below. 
A. LOC Risk Mitigation Criteria Using Abort Triggers 
An AT, in the context of SLS, is the means by which the SLS 
detects a crew safety-related failure and sends a 
recommendation to the Orion vehicle (Orion consists of the 
Crew Module, and the supporting Service Module, and 
Launch Abort System) to initiate an abort response. TEAMS® 
software can apply quantitative criteria to assess the 
effectiveness of proposed ATs in order to select the most 
effective detection suite to protect the astronauts from 
catastrophic failure (e.g. Loss of Crew - LOC) of the SLS 
vehicle. The FM-related requirements for which effectiveness 
measures are needed include those for safing, abort, and 
redundancy management, and also for reliability, availability, 
and safety (RAS).  
The metrics used derive from the theory of System Health 
Management (SHM), within which control theory can be 
extended to address FM, which is the operational aspect of 
SHM. See Chapter 1 of reference [9]. A natural extension of 
the various capability improvements described in this paper is 
to enhance and leverage TEAMS® to minimize and control the 
LOC likelihood via improved selection of a system’s failure 
detection capability. Specifically, TEAMS® can compute the 
LOC risk reduction metric and the related AT Effectiveness 
(ATE) metrics that are related to the ability of a sensor suite to 
provide timely detection of crew-threatening failures, which in 
turn activates the relevant abort response for the crew to 
escape the launch vehicle hazard in various failure scenarios. 
The primary driver for computing the LOC risk mitigation 
ATE metrics will be built-in TEAMS® analytic capabilities, 
which span modeling, information interchange, and analytic 
computations. QSI leverages concepts and techniques 
described in the AIAA SciTech 2017 paper titled “FM Metrics 
and V&V” [7] to compute the ATE metrics. 
Design engineers often use the FMECA analyses to identify 
potential system faults (failure modes), their probabilities of 
occurrence, their manifestation as functional failures (effects), 
monitoring mechanisms for making the effects visible, 
system-level implications in terms of safety, mission success, 
etc. PRA methodologies include logic models such as event 
trees and fault trees to identify, quantify and reason about risk. 
These models are scalable, include uncertainty in the risk 
assessment, and calculate the contribution of functional 
failures to the overall system risk. The current process of 
mapping FMEA to LOC/LOM end-states is done by manually 
examining the FMEA. This process is tedious and requires the 
examination of voluminous FMEA spreadsheets where the 
FMEA local, subsystem and system level effects are 
enumerated. In contrast, by capturing the FMEA spreadsheets 
and defined LOC/LOM events (effects) in the TEAMS® 
model, TEAMS® Designer can generate FMEA-based fault 
trees to support risk assessment that automatically traces from 
FMEA data to higher-level constructs such as PRA and 
Hazard fault trees. The fault tree computation exhaustively 
enumerates those FMEA initiating events that can account for 
a given end-state. Given the set of potential initiating events 
defined in the failure modes, probability splits between the 
classes of independent initiators can also be defined to support 
the logical definition of fault trees and in turn help determine 
(probabilistic) failure contribution to LOC/LOM events.  
Both the default TEAMS® model and TEAMS® fault tree 
export rely on the use of failure mode modules in TEAMS® as 
initiating events (Figure 2). Additionally, the fault trees 
require the use of mission phase definition, effect nodes and 
AND nodes. Effect nodes in TEAMS® are defined to represent 
the end-states to which failure effects may propagate from the 
initiating event failure modes. Three types of effect nodes are 
defined in the models, corresponding to three effect levels: 
local, isolation_level and system_wide. AND nodes are used 
to represent redundancy. It is the modeler’s responsibility to 
link the local effect nodes, isolation-level effect nodes, and 
AND nodes to the system-wide effect nodes. Disjunction 
occurs by default when multiple upstream links are input to an 
effect node – in this case, any one of the possible causes can 
lead to the top-level effect. Conjunction occurs by the use of 
AND nodes – in this case all of the possible causes need to 
occur to lead up to the top-level effect. In TEAMS®, a fault 
tree can be generated for each system-wide effect node. When 
the system-wide effect nodes correspond to LOC/LOM states, 
fault trees can be generated for each LOC/LOM scenario. 
 
Figure 2: TEAMS® Fault Tree Analysis 
Given a fault tree for a particular LOM-causing scenario 
(henceforth simply called a “LOM scenario”), a failure 
detection mechanism can be incorporated by placing 
appropriate sensors at the leaves of the fault tree to ensure that 
all paths up the tree are covered. These failure detection 
mechanisms can include timing information from the point 
that a failure occurs to the detection mechanisms, and 
subsequently the time to activate a response before the failure 
propagates to the end-effects (see Section IV.A - Failure 
Effect Propagation Timing (FEPT)). They may also include 
information about two or more detections existing along any 
given Fault Tree path, which means that more than one trigger 
can account for failures for a given LOM scenario. 
TEAMS® can be employed to select an optimal AT / failure 
detection suite by utilizing the dependency information among 
systems/ subsystems/ components, failure detection, and state 
estimation metrics of sensors in detecting the failure 
conditions (namely, the “truth table” or “confusion matrix” 
metrics of True Positive (TP), True Negative (TN), False 
Positive (FP), and False Negative (FN)). For the purpose of 
AT selection, the principal performance criteria for sensor 
allocation will be a “LOC Risk Mitigation” metric. This 
metric could be any criteria of relevance to the analyst such as 
detection effectiveness (fault detection probability), diagnostic 
effectiveness (fault isolation probability), etc. of the AT suite 
for the applicable failure scenarios. These failure scenario 
specific metrics are currently being incorporated in TEAMS®-
Designer under the NASA Phase II “FM Metrics and V&V” 
(contract # NNX16CM10C). 
The approach is elaborated in the following steps: 
• NASA subject matter experts (SMEs) generate the “AT 
Tables” containing a library of ATs and their associated 
warning times—the amount of time provided between the 
detection time and the time of the end-effect that causes 
LOM or LOC), state estimation metrics (such as FP, FN, 
etc.), and information about potential redundant failure 
detections (primary vs. secondary triggers, etc.). 
• Utilize the proposed multi-domain model integration 
capability (Section II) to import AT configuration files 
and the associated FMECA model. 
• Import the sensor library and their associated properties 
including the state estimation metrics associated with the 
AT algorithms associated with the relevant sensors (such 
as FP, FN etc. of TEAMS® tests.), FEPT and redundant 
detection information from the AT Tables into TEAMS®. 
• Import the top-level effects, mission phases, etc. from the 
AT Tables into TEAMS®, to form the building blocks of a 
FMECA model. 
• Perform Fault Tree analysis in TEAMS® for each LOM 
scenario by generating cut sets and the initiating failure 
causes. 
• Using the FM Metrics capabilities of TEAMS® Designer, 
generate the Confusion Matrix of the entire AT Suite for 
the LOM Failure Scenario (top-level effect). 
• Using the FP/FN calculations for the AT suite, evaluate 
the risk mitigation criteria [6] in order to determine the 
suite of ATs that are most suitable for meeting the “LOC 
Risk Mitigation” criteria.  
The implementation and demonstration of the aforementioned 
capability in TEAMS®-Designer was out of scope of this 
research paper. QSI and DST plan to demonstrate this feature 
in a future research effort. 
B. Abort Trigger FP and FN Quantification with Sensor 
Data Qualification (SDQ) 
On the SLS project, NASA has conducted trade studies on FP, 
FN quantification in the presence of SDQ mechanism in the 
analysis of ATs [8] related to LOC and LOM end-effects. One 
of the objectives for SLS is to determine the “value” of 
inclusion of SDQ, and in this regard two detection mechanism 
designs are compared, one with SDQ and one without. By 
comparing the FP, FN metrics between the two design 
architectures, NASA can determine how much benefit SDQ 
provides in detecting sensor failures and hence to determine 
whether certain SDQ algorithms should be included in the AT 
(failure detection) design. The trade study executes the 
following steps during its analysis: 
• Incorporates probabilities of failure modes, such as 
electrical shorts, high voltage, etc., associated with failed-
high (F2FS: failure-to-full-scale)/failed-low (F2Z: failure-
to-zero)/failed-intermediate observations; 
• Incorporates common-cause failures (redundant 
component failures due to common causes, i.e., cut sets of 
size 1 or single point failures); 
• Uses SAPHIRE to compute the Fault Tree of events 
leading to the FP and FN of the ATs; 
• Rolls up the probabilities caused by component and 
common-cause failures to calculate FP, FN of the AT; 
and  
• Calculates the minimal cut sets of sizes up to 5 (risk 
drivers). 
In this context, TEAMS® can leverage the built-in capabilities 
and concepts from the AIAA SciTech 2017 paper titled “FM 
Metrics and V&V” [7] to automate the SDQ study steps and 
generate AT FP/FN metrics as a special case of response 
effectiveness. This mechanism is elaborated in the following 
steps: 
• Create a TEAMS® Model utilizing the proposed multi-
domain model integration capability to import AT 
configuration (Excel) files and the associated FMECA 
model: 
• Top level end-effects in TEAMS® would represent the 
overall effect due to occurrence of Failure to Zero (F2Z) 
and Failure to Full Scale (F2FS) (F2ZEffect, F2SEffect); 
• Failure modes and their failure rates inside each 
component of the AT system will be gathered from 
FMECA documents; 
• Next, the failure modes will be assigned “Functions” 
(F2Z, F2S, etc.) based on their contributions to the AT. 
• TEAMS® AND nodes with a “threshold” can be used to 
specify m-out-of-n redundancy between the various 
components in the AT model. 
• Simulate various failure scenarios (e.g. multiple sensor(s) 
going F2Z, etc.) and compute the end-effect (LOM, LOC) 
FP/FN metrics utilizing the methods described in the “FM 
Metrics and V&V” AIAA SciTech 2017 paper. 
• TEAMS® Designer computes Fault Trees and Minimal 
Cut sets for the top-level Effect under different 
phases/operational modes, taking into account 
redundancies, and then rolls up probabilities of the 
implicated faults to the top-level end-effects. 
• The SDQ mechanism can be considered as series of 
switches (“System Modes”) that “switch out” certain 
failure modes from the model due to improved threshold 
classification. Apply appropriate mode changes to “switch 
in” the “SDQ mechanism” in the AT system, observe 
those top-level effect probabilities and their associated FP 
and FN reduction.   
• Finally, TEAMS® will perform “Fault Tree Analysis” for 
the F2ZEffect, F2SEffect, etc. End-Effects with 
applicable “System Modes” to apply various SDQ 
configurations, as well as the “Mission Duration”, to 
furnish the resulting “cut-sets” and their probabilities. 
The ability in TEAMS® to perform these analyses shows that 
it can be an enabling platform to facilitate efficient and cost-
effective FM design architectures and operations. 
IV. TEAMS® TOOLSET ENHANCEMENTS 
This section describes some of the TEAMS® Designer 
enhancements required to enable it to perform the architectural 
trade studies mentioned in Section III. 
A. Failure Effect Propagation Timing (FEPT) 
This step entails the incorporation of knowledge captured by 
building a FEPT table into the TEAMS® model. It intends to 
capture the intermediate times between a fault origination 
location and a failure detection location. Timing information 
is added to the links in a TEAMS® model. Such information is 
gathered from SMEs for each propagation path of interest. 
Critical faults must be detected, identified and acted upon 
within a specified time window to prevent potentially harmful 
ramifications. 
For any FM Control Loop (FMCL), the FM analyst must 
assess the race condition between the failure effect 
propagation time (FEPT) to the “critical failure effect” (CFE) 
and the overall time latency of failure detection through the 
failure response. In general, the response function in the 
FMCL needs to complete before the FEPT to the critical 
effect. On SLS, the difference between the two is identified as 
the “Abortability Table Warning Time (ATWT)”, which for 
the SLS-Orion integrated stack is defined as the difference 
between the occurrence of a large-scale explosion (or more 
generally, the directly crew-threatening failure effect) and 
when the Orion separates from the launch vehicle in an abort 
scenario. More generally, one desires the difference between 
the CFE time and the time to completion of the “critical 
failure response” (CFR). This needs to be greater than zero, 
where the units are those of time: CFE – CFR > 0. 
Currently TEAMS®-Designer has a simplistic FEPT capability 
in that it allows for time to be associated with a node or an arc. 
There are drawbacks with this simple implementation. FEPTs 
can differ even on the same node or arc, depending on which 
failure effect it is. For example, a large propellant leak can in 
some cases propagate faster than a small leak. Also, different 
types of physics can be associated with a given node or arc, 
such as the propagation of electrons, which travel rapidly but 
also produce heat, which often propagates much more slowly. 
In TEAMS® this would be represented as different functions. 
Thus, timing effects must be associated with each relevant 
effect (function), not just one per node or arc. One way to 
account for variable timing delays along the same path (e.g. 
electrical property vs. thermal property) could be to attach the 
timing information to individual “Functions” detected by the 
outcomes of TEAMS® tests.  
Timing effects are inherently statistical in nature, so that 
failure effect times should be represented as distributions with 
minima, modes, means, and maxima. Currently, TEAMS® is 
used primarily to account for the components along the 
Failure Effect Propagation Paths (FEPPs), and these must be 
accounted for in the FEPT analysis. FEPTs should ideally be 
modeled as function-dependent statistical distributions. 
Several distributions can be considered, depending on the 
application. These include common Gaussian and Poisson-like 
distributions with exponential characteristics, but also simple 
triangular distributions and bi-modal distributions. In practice 
on SLS, these statistical effects associated with individual 
scenarios are currently modeled as a triangular distribution. 
This has the advantage of requiring only three point estimate 
values for a worst, mode, and best value, from which a mean 
is easily calculated as the average of the three. This makes the 
estimation process simple, and given the need to estimate 
dozens or hundreds of these warning times for a complex 
system like SLS, simplicity is important. 
 Figure 3: FEPT in TEAMS® 
TEAMS®-Designer can be enhanced to associate timing with 
each relevant failure effect, not just one per node or arc. This 
is done by attaching the timing information to individual 
TEAMS® “Functions” detected by the outcomes of TEAMS® 
tests (see Figure 3). Moreover, the proposed user interface 
aims to capture the inherently statistical nature of timing 
effects by allowing the user to associate distributions to each 
FEPT. The interface would provide to the user the ability to 
specify the lower/upper bounds and the mode in the 
Triangular Distribution setting fields. 
B. Common Cause Failures (CCF) 
A key capability present in baseline studies undertaken by 
NASA to conduct FM architecture trade studies, and that 
TEAMS® currently lacks, is Common Cause Failures (CCFs) 
modeled across redundancies. CCFs are defined as the failure 
of multiple components, some of which could be part of the 
designed redundancy, due to shared identical failure modes 
such as a common design or manufacturing defect or from 
improper installation and maintenance. In redundant systems, 
it is very common for the system reliability rates to go lower 
than typical CCF rates, which are usually estimated at a 
blanket rate from 3% to 10% of component reliability values. 
Thus, CCF rates often dominate the system reliability 
estimates, as compared to random part failure rates. Being the 
dominant contributors to system unreliability, failing to model 
common cause failure means that system reliability estimates 
will be far more optimistic than warranted. Due to absence of 
CCFs in TEAMS®, there would be considerable mismatch in 
trade study analyses results provided by TEAMS® and those 
computed in the baseline studies by NASA. One key facet of 
CCFs are that when there is a failure of one of these 
components, the other common components’ likelihood of 
failure needs to be adjusted dynamically while conducting 
reliability analyses as well as for FDIR related computations.  
The NASA study to calculate the FP/FN for ATs accounted 
for Common Cause Failure (CCF) events in the SAPHIRE 
model of the FT. In that study, CCF events were modeled in 
the FT to account for the possible failure of AT components 
due to external causes. For example, multiple Flight 
Computers (FC) might fail simultaneously or generate 
erroneous signal output indicating the occurrence of an 
abnormal system state. This type of failure event can be 
caused by loose connections of interface cables. Cable 
connection errors can be attributed to installation or assembly 
errors (human error), high levels of vibration during launch 
vehicle ascent, or by design faults in FC hardware, firmware 
or software. To support this capability, TEAMS® needs to 
provide a user interface to mark a set of components as part of 
CCFs. Furthermore, the interface needs to provide the user the 
ability to specify the coupling between the components of 
CCF sets such as common cause scaling factors. Possible 
methods to incorporate CCFs in TEAMS® analyses include 
CCF probability equations (Mosleh, Rasmuson, & Marshall, 
1998) and associated alpha factor values (Atwood, Kelly, 
Marshall, Prawdzik, & Stetkar 1996). 
V. EXAMPLE CALCULATION 
A. Semantic-Based Multi-Domain Model Capture 
QSI implemented a rudimentary capability to import domain-
independent model into TEAMS® to utilize its built-in analytic 
capabilities for quantitatively conducting various FM 
Architecture Trade Studies. Specifically, for the “LOC Risk 
Mitigation via selection of Abort Trigger Suite” Architecture 
Trade Study, QSI captured the Abort Analysis Matrix (AAM) 
(the AAM is a specific instantiation of an “AT Table” 
identified above) domain information, including mission 
phases, effects, Tests and FP/FN information. Based on the 
information contained in the AAM spreadsheet, QSI 
formulated the steps to enable TEAMS® to perform this study. 
Figure 4 shows the numbered steps, although a partial set, to 
incorporate the study into TEAMS®: 
1. The defined LOM Failure Scenario from the “PRA Input” 
worksheet would be incorporated into the TEAMS® 
Model. Corresponding “Phases” will also be imported 
into the TEAMS® model. QSI developed a mechanism to 
import LOM Failure Scenarios (End Effects, Phases) 
from the “PRA Input” worksheet. Failure Modes defined 
for that scenario will have to come from the relevant Risk 
Model – could be FMECA, CAFTA or PRA – and their 
associations with the resulting End-Effects would be 
incorporated into TEAMS®.  
2. Import the AT detections from the “MFM Input” 
worksheet as “Tests” into the TEAMS® model. 
3. The FN (%) and FP (%) values would be directly 
imported for each Test. Since FP/FN for an AT are 
specified on a per scenario basis, TEAMS® may need to 
support specifying Test FP/FN values on a per function 
basis. 
4. The ATWT Times for each Test will be translated into 
FEPT (see Section IV.A) for the detected “Function” 
inside that Test. 
 Figure 4: LOC Risk Mitigation using Abort Trigger in 
TEAMS® 
The resulting TEAMS® model from the aforementioned 
exercise is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Translated TEAMS® Model from the AAM 
In the figure above, the ATs are imported in TEAMS® 
Designer as Tests. As mentioned before, each AT can have a 
different FP/FN value in different scenarios. Since TEAMS® 
Designer currently does not have the facility to capture 
multiple FP/FN values for each test outcome, we simplified 
the logic by taking an average over all the scenarios to assign 
a single value of FP/FN for a test outcome. Each scenario was 
imported as a TEAMS® Designer Effect (This works because 
a scenario defines a specific failure effect as its “essential 
feature”; this effect usually has multiple causes.) with the 
corresponding Phase attached to it and assigned a default 
Criticality of “Critical”. When Phase Criticality information is 
available, these fields will be updated. Since each scenario in 
the AAM appears across multiple phases, each of those phases 
are associated with the Effect in TEAMS® Designer. 
B. Abort Trigger FP and FN Quantification with SDQ 
Architecture Trade Study 
For the “Abort Trigger FP and FN Quantification with SDQ” 
study, QSI created an equivalent TEAMS® model of the AT 
and conducted trade study analyses in TEAMS® similar to the 
one in the publication [8]. This FM trade study quantifies the 
benefit of having the SDQ processing module on the detection 
process for ATs. Figure 6 shows a notional approach with 
numbered steps describing the process to incorporate the study 
into TEAMS®. The numbered steps are described below: 
1. Based on the schematics of the Abort Trigger (AT) 
illustrated in the publication, create an equivalent model 
in TEAMS® Designer comprising of “Power System 
(PS)”, “Sensor Electronics (SE)”, etc. components. If 
models for the AT already exist, employ the “Multi-
domain Model Integration” techniques to import the 
TEAMS® model. 
2. Augment the TEAMS® model of the AT with the SDQ 
module in the form of component blocks and switching 
mechanisms (“Switch Modes”). This will enable 
switching in and out of various SDQ blocks associated 
with various AT hardware configurations. 
3. Add “Failure Modes” associated with each block of the 
AT in the corresponding TEAMS® Components. Use 
published Mean Time To Failure (MTTFs) numbers. 
SDQ blocks can also have their own Failure Modes. 
4. Assign “Functions” (F2Z, F2S, etc.) to each Failure Mode 
based on their contributions to the AT. Insert top level 
“Tests/Effects” detecting the F2Z and F2S Functions (e.g. 
F2ZEffect, F2SEffect, etc.) in the TEAMS® model. 
5. Insert “AND Nodes” between the various components in 
the AT model. The “AND Node” “Thresholds” will 
specify the M-out-of-N fault tolerance of each sub-
system. 
6. Perform “Fault Tree Analysis” in TEAMS® for the 
F2ZEffect, F2SEffect, etc. End-Effects with applicable 
“System Modes” to apply various SDQ configurations, as 
well as the “Mission Duration”, to furnish the resulting 
“cut-sets” and their probabilities.  
 
Figure 6: AT FP/FN Quantification using SDQ in TEAMS® 
Based on the schematics of the AT illustrated in the 
publication and the approach mentioned in Section III.B, QSI 
created an equivalent model in TEAMS® Designer comprising 
of “Power System (PS)”, “Sensor Electronics (SE)”, etc. 
components. QSI also augmented the TEAMS® model of the 
AT with the SDQ module in the form of component blocks 
and switching mechanisms (“Switch Modes”). This will 
enable switching in and out of various SDQ blocks associated 
with various AT hardware configurations. The TEAMS® 
model of the AT is shown in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7: TEAMS® Model of the AT 
There are two top level Effects that detect the F2Z and F2S 
Functions. The Failure Modes and their Failure Rates inside 
the AT components are assigned from the study (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8: Assigning Failure Rates in the AT TEAMS® Model 
Failure Modes are assigned “Functions” (F2Z, F2S, etc.) 
based on the component output signals and their contributions 
to the AT as defined in the study (Figure 9).  
 
Figure 9: Assigning Functions in the AT TEAMS® Model 
 
Figure 10: Performing Fault Tree Analysis for the AT Model 
The results from TEAMS® Fault Tree Analysis are shown 
below: 
• The probability of occurrence of F2ZEffect (FP): 
o With SDQ OFF = 8.46E-10 (cutset size 2) + 
6.22E-21 (cutset size 3)  
o With SDQ ON = 6.46E-10 (cutset size 2) 
• The probability of occurrence of F2FSEffect (FN): 
o With SDQ OFF = 7.55E-10 (cutset size 2) + 
3.66E-16 (cutset size 3)  
o With SDQ ON = 5.67E-10 (cutset size 2)  
• Hence, the net benefit of having SDQ 
o For mitigating F2ZEffect (FP) = 23.64% 
o For mitigating F2FSEffect (FN) = 24.9%  
All of these calculations are performed with generic, not 
actual SLS numbers. The lower overall probabilities for the 
F2ZEffect and F2FSEffect in TEAMS® compared to the study 
are possibly due to absence of CCFs, which are known to 
contribute significantly to the likelihoods of the FP and FN 
occurrences in the AT. The percentage benefit computed in 
TEAMS® was roughly double that of the study but of the same 
order of magnitude.  
Future exercises in this study will incorporate alternate SDQ 
mechanisms that can be modeled using TEAMS® 
configuration for the trade space study. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper describes ongoing work to implement FM 
quantification techniques in TEAMS® using metrics derived 
from the theory of SHM and FM, and using genericized SLS 
data and methods. The results were validated by comparison 
to actual SLS results, but again using genericized data. QSI 
was able to capture the domain knowledge from the AAM 
spreadsheet into a sparse but representative TEAMS® model. 
The TEAMS® analysis results from the AT FP and FN 
Quantification with SDQ Architecture Trade Study are in line 
with the ones from the NASA study. The comparison 
demonstrates that the methods being developed in TEAMS® 
generate similar, but not identical results to the actual 
calculations on SLS, with the primary difference likely being 
from TEAMS® not yet having the CCF modeling capability. 
This is a crucial capability for assessment of redundant 
systems that needs to be incorporated in TEAMS®. Some of 
the FM Architecture Trade studies identified in Section III 
such as the “AT Selection for LOC Risk Mitigation” were out 
of the scope and hence were not included in this paper. 
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